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Abstract
Component-based software development (CBSD) offers
many advantages like reduced product time to market,
reduced complexity and cost etc. Despite these
advantages its wide scale utilization in developing
security critical systems is currently hampered because of
lack of suitable design techniques to efficiently manage
the complete system security concerns in the development
process. The use of Commercial of the Shelf (COTS)
components can introduce various security and reliability
risks in the system. In this paper we propose a
methodology for efficient management of all the system
security concerns involved in the design of component
based systems. Our methodology is based on formally
representing the system security specifications and
component capabilities. We identify the metrics for
correlating both and suggest extensions to a previously
proposed software development process, for selection of
suitable components and integration mechanisms. The
proposed solution ensures due treatment of all the
security concerns for the complete system in the
acquisition efforts.

1. Introduction
COTS components are defined as components
that are bought from a third party vendor and integrated
into a system [6]. Because of the savings in development
resources, offered by CBSD and the fast pace at which
current software development is proceeding, large-scale
component reuse has resulted. Advantages like reduced
product time to market, reduced complexity and cost etc,
offered by CBSD have resulted into increased COTS
component acquisition. Despite these advantages quality
and risk concerns currently limit the application of COTS
based systems to non-critical applications [10, 11]. The
COTS components usage can also result into various
other problems like increasing the system vulnerability to

risks arising form third-party development, such as
vendor longevity and intellectual property procurement
[7].
An optimized software development process for
CBSD has been proposed in [7]. The presented approach
uses software metrics for guiding acquisition and
integration efforts by using multi objective optimization.
Multi objective optimization is used to select highest
quality components that will yield the highest quality
within the given cost. Reliability, complexity and cost are
the component metrics used for system level optimization.
The security considerations for the complete system are
not considered in this approach. Given the benefits
associated with COTS based design the major hurdle in
their wide scale usage especially in critical applications is
lack of system design techniques that could ensure
complete fulfillment of all the system security
specifications.
In this paper we propose a methodology for
efficient management of all the system security concerns
involved in the design of component based systems. Our
methodology formally represents the system security
specifications and component capabilities. We identify
the metrics for correlating both and propose extensions to
the software development process presented in [7], for
selection of suitable components and integration
mechanisms. The black box testing of selected
components is then performed to assign confidence levels
(ranging from 0 to 1) to each component based on its
verification results. The confidence level assignment
helps the system designers in more accurate assessment
of risks associated with selected configurations. The
proposed solution thus ensures due treatment of all the
security concerns for the complete system in the
acquisition efforts.
The organization of the rest of the paper is as
follows. We discuss the related work in component based
system design in section two. The outline of proposed
methodology is presented in section three. The discussion
about integration of proposed methodology with the
approach presented in [7] is given in section four
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followed by conclusion and discussion about avenues for
future research.

2. Related Area
The problem of integrating COTS components
into systems with high dependability requirements has
been considered in [4]. The untrustworthy COTS
components are treated as a potential source of faults and
protective wrappers are added to them to generate
idealized fault-tolerant COTS components.
This
mitigates the possible problems due to architectural
mismatch between the components and the rest of the
system. The sandboxing approach presented in [11] is
similar to the concept of restriction (section 3.4)
presented in this paper; however our methodology also
guides the system designer through all the phases of
system design including component sandboxing. Error
containment wrappers have been used in [5] to increase
the robustness of the components in dealing with errors
coming from their environment. The proposed approach
adopts a gray-box perspective of the component i.e.
considering that the component structure is known but
non-modifiable. Our approach is however more general as
we consider the components to be black boxes (which is
mostly the case with COTS components) for which only
known information is their advertised interfaces and
capabilities.
An architecture for integrating COTS
components has been presented in [9] along with some
informal rules to facilitate the integration; whereas our
approach guides the integration process through a formal
methodology. A reference model for the assembly of
components based systems has been proposed in [3] to
account the key activities in CBSD process. The focus
has been on the technical aspects of the integration of
COTS based system. Our approach complements this
work by providing formal methodology to efficiently
manage all the security concerns in the integration
process. The importance of assessing the risks associated
with selection of COTS components has been highlighted
in [2]. The step 5 in our methodology (section 3.2) is a
step forward in this direction by formally guiding the
system developer through assignment of confidence
levels to the components.

3. Proposed Methodology
3.1 Assumptions
Here we discuss few assumptions that we make
while developing the methodology. We assume that for
all the components the system designer has the complete
knowledge of their functional specifications and security

capabilities. Where security capabilities reflect the
security controls implemented in the component by the
vendor and advertised by them. We assume that for each
functional requirement of the system a family of
components (FOC) is available that includes all the
components capable of meeting that particular functional
requirement. The FOCi will be defined as set of
components in i th FOC i.e. FOCi

{Ci1 , Ci 2 ," Cim } where

th

Cil represents the l component in that FOC. The
components within a FOC might have different security
capabilities. Moreover following simplifying assumptions,
as also done in [7] are made.
1.
The families of components have nonoverlapping functionality. Thus, exactly one
component is chosen from each family to design
the system.
2.
The components are connected serially,
i.e., each component is interfaced to at most two
other components.
These assumptions do not lead to a significant
loss of generality as also pointed out in [7]. Further we
assume that system designer is able to breakdown the
complete system security specifications into components
level security requirements/specifications in a consistent
manner. Such an approach for assuring security
constraints in architectural decomposition has been
presented in [8]. This decomposition is used for matching
the security capabilities of components in each FOC with
the security specifications for that FOC.

3.2 Methodology Outline
Following is the outline of the complete
methodology followed in guiding the CBSD process;
same is also represented in figure 1.
1.
Mathematical formulation of the system security
specifications and components security capabilities.
2.
Identification of metrics for correlating FOC
security specifications with components capabilities.
3.
Specification of system security objectives.
4.
Selection of component configurations to ensure
that overall system functional objectives are optimized
while guaranteeing that the system security objectives are
achieved. A reasonable fraction of total no of possible
configurations is selected.
5.
Verification of selected components security
capabilities through black box testing and assigning
confidence levels to them based on their testing results.
6.
The assigned confidence levels are compared
against predetermined threshold for each FOC. This
comparison might result into rejection of all selected
configurations; therefore the component configuration
selection process of step 4 may need to be again followed
with the components confidence level as the new
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parameter used in selection process. The final selected
configuration will be assigned a confidence level based
on the component confidence levels.

3.3 Mathematical Formulation
The formalization of the system security
specifications and components capabilities is carried out
as per following details.
1. S {S1 , S 2 ,...........S n } is the set of system security
specifications, such that Si corresponds to system
specifications for i th FOC where n is the total number of
FOC’s.
2. Si {SS1 , SS2 ,.............SSk } is a set of sub system
specifications for each FOC.
Start
1

Mathematical
Formulation

RBAC. The individual members of a particular SSi can
be referenced as Sp ( SSi ) , Attrib( SSi ) and P( SSi ) .
4. Pai (name, value) is a tuple where name and
value represents the details for a specific parameter
corresponding to a specific sub system specification.
5. Scil {SS1 , SS2 ,.......SS r } is a set of security capabilities
for l th component of i th FOC where SSi ' s are same as
defined earlier. Individual security capabilities of
component will be referred by Sec j ( Scil ) such
that Sec j ( Scil )

SS j

3.3.1 Example 1. Consider a system in which
components are to be selected from two FOC’s and we
assume two components in each FOC. The system
security specifications for the FOC’s are following.
System
FOC 1
FOC 2
Specifications
Cryptographic
support
Authentication
Mechanism
Access Control

2

System Objectives

of component Cil .

DES

RSA

SSL/TLS

SSL/TLS

RBAC

GTRBAC
capable
handling
location
system_load context

3

Metrics Identification

Further on the components capabilities are.

4

Configuration Selection
5

of
and

6

Security Capabilities
Verification
6

End

Figure 1: Methodology outline
3. SSi ( Sp, Attrib, P ) is a tuple where Sp represents the
security policy corresponding to each sub system
specification and Attrib specifies the attribute for that
P
is
a
set
of
security
policy
and
parameters P {Pa1 , Pa2 ,............Pa j } . In case if the
security policy Sp is unconstrained then P is set to none.
In case of common Sp of different SSi , the SSi ' s will be
partially ordered based on Attrib and P. For example if
and
SS1 { AC , RBAC , none}
SS2 { AC , TRBAC , none} then SS1 E SS 2 is true. Here
AC represents access control and RBAC and TRBAC
represents role based access control and temporal role
based
access
control
respectively.
The
condition SS1 E SS 2 is true because TRBAC extends
RBAC with temporal constraints and thus subsumes

Component
Capabilities

Comp11

Comp12

Comp21

Comp22

Cryptographic
support
Authentication
Mechanism
Access
Control

RSA

DES

RSA

DES

Kerberos

SSL/TLS

SSL/TLS

Kerberos

MLS

TRBAC

GTRBAC

RBAC

The abovementioned terms are explained here.
Two major cryptographic schemes in use today are
symmetric key and public key based schemes. The Data
Encryption Standard (DES) and Rivest Shamir Adleman
(RSA) are examples of symmetric key and public key
systems, respectively. Secure Socket Layer/ Transport
Layer Security (SSL/TLS) and Kerberos both provide
authentication support through cryptographic mechanisms
but use different technologies. Multi Level Security
(MLS) model of access control is based on assigning
security classifications to objects and permitting user
access to these based on users security clearances. The
General TRBAC (GTRBAC) access control model
extends TRBAC by including temporal and contextual
constraints.
In the above example Compil represents l th
component of i th FOC. The mathematical formulation for
this example would be:
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S

{S1 , S2 } Where

S1

{(Crypto, DES , none), ( Auth, SSL / TLS , none)

( AC , RBAC , none)}
S2

{(Crypto, RSA, none), ( Auth, SSL / TLS , none)

( AC , GTRBAC ,[(location, true)( system _ load , true)])}
Sc11

{(Crypto, RSA, none), ( Auth, Kerberos, none)

( AC , MLS , none)}
Sc12

{(Crypto, DES , none), ( Auth, SSL / TLS , none)

( AC , TRBAC , none)}
Sc21

{(Crypto, RSA, none), ( Auth, SSL / TLS , none)

( AC , GTRBAC , none)}
Sc22

{(Crypto, DES , none), ( Auth, Kerberos, none)

The capability excess between a COTS
component capability Scis and system specification Si
reflects the no of features in the capabilities of
sth component in i th FOC that are irrelevant to the
specification of that FOC. If Si and Scis are equal then this
would be assigned none value.
As the values of both capability excess and
specification deficit could be either none or set of SS j ,
thus they would be reflexive, transitive and antisymmetric
for E relation (because of partial ordering in SS j ) .
Hence they will also have partial ordering. We consider
D ( Si , Scis ) E E ( Si , Scis ) iff
SS j  D ( Si , Scis ), SS j E SS r SSr  E ( Si , Scis )
where Sp( SS j )

Sp( SSr )

( AC , RBAC , none)}

3.4 Identification of Metrics
Suitable selection of metrics for comparison of
FOC security specifications with the components
capabilities is important for guiding the configurations
selection process (step 4). We have borrowed the
concepts of functional deficit and functional excess used
in [6] to define capability excess and specification deficit.
Before defining these terms we first define the difference
(-) operator.
Definition 1:- The difference of a system specification Si
and a component capability Scis is denoted by
Si  Scis and defined by:
Si  Scis {s : s  Si and s  Scis }
Definition 2:- The specification deficit between a system
specification Si and component capability Scis is denoted
by D ( Si , Scis ) and defined by:
D ( Si , Scis ) Si  ( Si  Scis )
The specification deficit between a system
specification Si and COTS component capability Scis
reflects the no of features in the specification of i th FOC
that are left unfulfilled by the capabilities of
sth component in that FOC. If Si and Scis are equal then
this would be assigned none value.
Definition 3:- The capability excess of component
capability Scis with respect to a system specification Si is
denoted by E ( Si , Scis ) and defined by:
E ( Si , Scis ) Scis  ( Si  Scis )

Definition 4:- The deficit cover for specification deficit
D ( Si , Scis ) and capability excess E ( Si , Scis ) is denoted by
I ( Si , Scis ) and defined by:

I ( Si , Scis ) True  D ( Si , Scis ) E E ( Si , Scis )
else False

The “True” value of deficit cover thus denotes
that all the deficient features in the specification of
i th FOC are capable of being fulfilled through the features
in the capabilities of sth component in that FOC.
For the security specifications and capabilities
given in example 1 the value of specification deficit and
capability excess are:D ( S1 , Sc11 ) S1 , D ( S1 , Sc12 ) { AC , RBAC , none}

D ( S 2 , Sc21 ) { AC , GTRBAC ,[(location, true)
( system _ load , true)]}, D ( S2 , Sc22 ) S 2
E ( S1 , Sc11 ) Sc11 , E ( S1 , Sc12 ) {( AC , TRBAC , none)}
E ( S 2 , Sc21 ) {( AC , GTRBAC , none)} , E ( S 2 , Sc22 ) Sc22
Moreover
D ( S1 , Sc12 ) E E ( S1 , Sc12 )  I ( S1 , Sc12 ) True and
D ( S 2 , Sc21 ) E E ( S 2 , Sc21 )  I ( S2 , Sc21 ) True

3.5 Security Objectives
The security objectives for the system would be
to ensure that the system security specifications for each
FOC are met by the security capabilities of the selected
components (there could be more than one component
selected from each FOC in the multiple configurations
selected in step 4) in that FOC. Hence if we consider Ci*
being the component finally selected in i th FOC, in some
configuration, then this objective can be stated as:(D ( Si , Scici* )
none)  I ( Si , Scici* ) i , 1 d i d n
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This means that with respect to system security
considerations a selected component is only acceptable
either if its capabilities fully match the system
specifications
for
that
FOC
(in
that
none ) or its specification deficit is
case D ( Si , Scici* )
true. The second condition implies that selected
component has capabilities that are in excess of the
system specification and therefore the integration module
would also have to curtail its additional capabilities. We
define this process as restriction.

number of best configurations from them, where t is
derived as follows:
Total no of suitable configurations
t
Threshold parameter (O )
The threshold parameter O will be selected by
system developer based on previous results and empirical
observations. Note that all the selected t configurations
meet the system security specifications. The reason for
not considering all the suitable configurations is the huge
cost of black box testing procedure (performed in step 5)
if all the suitable configurations are selected.

4. Security Concerns Integration

4.2 Verification of Component Capabilities

fully covered by its capability excess i.e. I ( Si , Scici* ) is

4.1 Components Selection Strategy
As already explained in the previous section the
selected components in each FOC should be able to
satisfy the system security specifications for that FOC
thus initial pruning of components would be carried out
before the selection with respect to functional objectives
proceed.
Definition 5:- The process of selection of components
that satisfy system security specification is called pruning
and is formally defined as:Pruning:
FOCi o FOCic i, 1 d i d n st Cs  FOCic
(D ( Si , Scics )

none)  I ( Si , Scics )

Thus after pruning only those components are
left in each FOC for which either there is no specification
deficit or the deficit cover is true. The functional
objectives would now guide the selection process. In case
if deficit cover is true this implies that the component
capabilities in excess of system specifications need to be
curtailed by restriction. Thus additional cost of restriction
code needs to be considered in the component selection
process. If the objective is to select most reliable
configuration with minimum possible complexity within
a total system cost constraint then the metrics of interest
could be reliability, complexity and cost of the
components and integration modules. The component
selection process will then proceed as a multi objective
optimization problem as per procedure used in [7] by
including the additional cost, reliability and complexity of
restriction module (in case if components with lesser
capabilities are also required to be considered for
selection then additional cost will be due to integration
mechanisms providing the deficit capabilities). The above
multi objective optimization procedure would return a set
of suitable configurations which will be filtered to select t

In this step the security capabilities of the
components used in configurations selected in previous
step will be verified by black box testing. Black box
testing is actually functional testing of the software
product as the internal structure of the product is not
considered while testing rather its external behavior
model, which is in turn guided by its specifications,
guides the testing process [1]. The purpose of this process
is to verify the match between the advertised component
capabilities and their implementation. We suggest this
capability verification for components security
capabilities because it is important to ensure that the
components are actually able to provide security
functionality as per their advertised capabilities. Failure
of a component to provide the strength of security
controls as advertised can result into catastrophic failures
of the complete system.
The outcome of this process will be assignment
of confidence levels (ranging from 0 to 1) to each
component based on its verification results. Higher levels
reflect more trust on the implementation. Assignment of
these levels definitely depends on the extent of testing
carried out and component performance. For different
system designs their may be dissimilar stress on the
security policies implemented in the component (where
these policies are also definitely reflected in component
security capabilities), therefore a formal framework is
required to express the overall confidence level as
weighted average of confidence level of individual
capabilities. We define J ( Sec j ( Scil )) as confidence level
for the security capability Sec j ( Scil ) of component Cil
and overall confidence level is defined as follows.
Definition 6:- The component security confidence level is
denoted by J (Cil ) and is defined as:-
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selected configuration only one component would be
selected from a specific FOC therefore component
confidence level can also be interpreted as FOC
confidence level and thus J ( FOCi ) J (Cil ) .

formally guides the system designer in the selection of
suitable configurations while ensuring due consideration
is given to all the system requirements.
In the future we plan to conduct case studies to
formally evaluate the efficacy of our proposed
methodology. We also plan to study the robustness of our
methodology in terms of variation in the component
confidence levels that can be tolerated by the system
safely. An important avenue of future research is to
extend the proposed methodology to accommodate
dynamic composition of component based systems. We
expect this study to be very valuable in guiding the wide
scale adoption of CBSD techniques.

4.3 Finalizing System Design

References

¦ J (Sec (Sc
j

J (Cil )

il

)) u V j

j

Where V j is the

¦1
j

assigned weightage
capability Sec j ( Scil )

for

the

component

security

In case if all the security capabilities are equally
important then V j would be 1 for all. As for a particular

The computed component confidence levels will
be used for further refinement of selected configurations.
Threshold parameters Q i 1 d i d n, 0 d Q i d 1 will be
used for rejecting all those configurations for which the
following condition does not hold true.
J ( FOCi ) t Q i 1 d i d n
Thus all the configurations with confidence level
for any FOC below a specific threshold will be rejected.
Therefore it might happen that all the selected
configurations are rejected, in that case the system
designer can either relax the threshold parameters or
select the next t best configurations from the results
obtained after step 4(component selection strategy). The
new selected configurations will again go through step 5
to finalize selection of best configuration.
If after the above scrutinizing process the
number of available selected configurations is greater
than or equal to 2, then a modified component selection
strategy (modification to step 4) will be used for final
configuration selection. This component selection process
can again proceed as a multi objective optimization
problem by including the component confidence levels as
another metric and solving the resulting configuration
problem. The confidence level of the finally selected
configuration will be a vector consisting of confidence
levels of each FOC.

5. Conclusion
Despite the many advantages offered by CBSD,
its wide scale utilization in developing security critical
systems is currently hampered because of lack of suitable
techniques to efficiently manage the complete system
security concerns in the development process. The
methodology proposed in this paper allows efficient
management of system security concerns during all the
stages of CBSD process. The proposed methodology
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